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ANTITRUST IMMUNITY FOR JOINT EFFORTS TO
INFLUENCE ADJUDICATION BEFORE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND
COURTS-FROM NOERR-PENNING TON' TO
TRUCKING UNLIMITED
S. CHESTERFIELD OPPENHEIM*
Breadth of Noerr Rationale Applied to the Legislative and Executive
Branches of Government
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.' the United States Supreme Court unanimously announced a broad
antitrust immunity2 for concerted political activity designed to influence
enactment of laws by a legislature or enforcement of laws by executive
government agencies. In order to comprehend this far-reaching subordi-
nation of the antitrust laws to the paramount right of private groups to
petition government, the factual context and rationale of the Court's
opinion are set forth in particularized fashion.
The development of intermodal types of transportation by railroads
and truckers3 precipitated what the Court described as an economic "life
*Formerly Professor of Law, The George Washington University and University of
Michigan; Co-Chairman, Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws, 1953-1955; Chairman, Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, 1961-
1962; Of Counsel, Howrey, Simon, Baker & Murchison, Washington, D.C.
1365 U.S. 127 (1961).
21n this discussion the term "antitrust immunity" is used to refer to conduct the Court
through judicial construction regards as never intended by Congress to come within the
scope of the antitrust laws, in this instance, the Sherman Act.
This is distinguished from the term "antitrust exemption" which, in the federal area,
usually refers to conduct which would otherwise fall within the antitrust laws but is ex-
empted therefrom. This may result from judicial interpretation of the antitrust statutes or
when they are read in pari materia with other laws. Other areas of antitrust exemption are
the creations of specific congressional legislation.
See generally Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Exemptions, 33 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
L.J. 1 (1967). On regulated industries and antitrust exemptions, see generally S. C. OPPEN-
HElM & G. E. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 37-75 (3d ed. 1968).
3See S.C. OPPENHEIM, The National Transportation Policy and Intercarrier Competi-
tive Rates, ch. 1 (1945).
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or death" struggle between the railroads and motor carriers for the very
profitable business of long hauls of freight. Out of this rivalry stemmed
an antitrust suit by a group of truck operators and their trade association
against twenty-four eastern railroads, their association, known as the
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, and their public relations firm,
charging a conspiracy to restrain trade and to monopolize the long-
distance freight business in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.'
The Court noted that the complaint in essence alleged that the rail-
roads had conspired by engaging a public relations firm "to conduct a
publicity campaign against the truckers designed to foster the adoption
and retention of laws and law enforcement practices destructive of the
trucking business, to create an atmosphere of distaste for the truckers
among the general public, and to impair the relationships existing be-
tween the truckers and their customers."5 One of the specified charges
was that the defendants had persuaded the Governor of Pennsylvania to
veto a proposed statute which would have allowed the truckers to carry
heavier loads over Pennsylvania roads. The plaintiffs sought treble dam-
ages and an injunction restraining the continuance of the allegedly unlaw-
ful practices.
In an extensive opinion by Justice Black, the unanimous Court first
ruled that
no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon mere
attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws. ...
Accordingly, it has been held that where a restraint upon trade or
monopolization is the result of valid governmental action . . . no
violation of the [Sherman] Act can be made out.
6
Noting further that under our form of government the policy of enact-
ment or enforcement of a law is a matter for the legislative or executive
branch, the Court declared it was equally clear that
the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from
associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or
the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that
would produce a restraint or a monopoly.
7
Concerted action to that end, the Court observed, was "essentially
dissimilar" from agreements traditionally condemned as illegal per se
'15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970).




Sherman Act violations.' The legislative and executive branches of repre-
sentative democracy
act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the whole
concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people
to make their wishes known to their representatives.'
The legislative history of the Sherman Act, the Court continued,
reveals that its purpose was to regulate business activity, not political
activity. The Court noted that a contrary interpretation "would raise
important constitutional questions," such as the right of petition guaran-
teed by the Bill of Rights. 0
In further explication of its rationale, the Court took pains to under-
score the breadth of the antitrust immunity in other respects. Accepting
the district court's finding that the sole purpose of the railroads in seeking
to influence the enactment and enforcement of laws was "to destroy the
truckers as competitors for the long-distance freight business," that fact
would not "transform conduct otherwise lawful into a violation of the
Sherman Act." For the right of the people to inform their government
representatives "cannot properly be made to depend upon their intent in
doing so."" So long as the conduct is directed toward obtaining govern-
mental action, its legality is not affected by any anticompetitive purpose
to bring advantages to the railroads and disadvantages to the competitive
truckers.
Next the Court pointed out that even though the so-called "third party
technique" of a publicity propaganda campaign, 2 camouflaged as spon-
taneous declarations of independent groups, falls short of generally ap-
proved ethical standards, such tactics are still political activity. Said the
Court:
The proscriptions of the [Sherman] Act, tailored as they are for
'One such violation would be an agreement among competitors to fix the market price.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). Horizontal territorial restrictions were most recently
condemned as illegal per se in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 92 S. Ct. 1126
(1972).
1365 U.S. at 137.
"1365 U.S. at 138. One of the defenses of the railroads was that the activities com-
plained of were constitutionally protected under the First Amendment. The Court's re-
sponse was that its view regarding the proper construction of the Sherman Act made it
unnecessary to consider that defense. Id.
"Id. at 138-39.
1Id. at 140. The railroads employed a public relations firm and the truckers also
employed the third-party technique. The district court found that the truckers' campaign
for the most part was directed at obtaining legislation beneficial to them rather than harmful
to the railroads.
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the business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the
political arena.
3
The Court even ruled out deliberate deception of the public and public
officials as irrelevant when the publicity campaign is to influence legisla-
tion and law enforcement.
There were no specific findings that the publicity campaign directly
sought to induce anyone to refuse to deal with the truckers. Moreover,
the Court observed, the knowing infliction of some direct but incidental
injury upon the truckers did not render illegal the publicity campaign
aimed at influencing legislation.
Finally, the Court announced a "sham" exception to its sweeping
pronouncements of antitrust immunity:
There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, osten-
sibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere
sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor
and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified. But this
certainly is not the case here. No one denies that the railroads were
making a genuine effort to influence legislation and law enforce-
ment practices. Indeed, if the version of the facts set forth in the
truckers' complaint is fully credited, as it was by the courts below,
that effort was not only genuine but also highly successful. Under
these circumstances, we conclude that no attempt to interfere with
business relationships in a manner proscribed by the Sherman Act
is involved in this case. 4
It is evident that, apart from the "sham" exception, the Court con-
sciously avoided any rationalization for justifying application of the Sher-
man Act. Rejecting that approach of the courts below, Justice Black
unequivocally declared:
In doing so, we have restored what appears to be the true
nature of the case-a "no-holds-barred fight" between two indus-
tries both of which are seeking control of a profitable source of
business.'
5
Noerr Extended In Pennington
It is little wonder that the virtually complete antitrust immunity the





that private groups were given a blank check for embarking upon anti-
competitive schemes.
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington" is usually cited as
affirming Noerr but on its particularized facts it is in reality an extension
of the Noerr antitrust immunity. In Pennington a small bituminous coal
operator filed a treble damage counterclaim alleging a conspiracy be-
tween UMW and certain large coal operators to place onerous financial
burdens on small, nonunionized coal mines, thus making them unable to
compete.
The counterclaim alleged that as part of the conspiracy the large coal
mine owners had successfully induced the Secretary of Labor to establish
under the Walsh-Healy Act 17 a minimum wage for employees of contrac-
tors selling coal to the Tennessee Valley Authority. It was alleged that
the minimum wage was higher than in other industries and made it diffi-
cult for the small coal operators to compete in the TVA market under
term contracts. It was also alleged that the large operators had urged the
TVA to adhere to the spirit of the Walsh-Healy Act by curtailing its spot
market purchases, a tactic which precluded the small operators from
bidding on the remaining TVA business. This, it was further alleged,
would foster the conspiracy among the large mine operators to dump
large tonnages of coal on the TVA spot market at very low prices with
the purpose of driving the small operators out of business.
In the pertinent part of a lengthy opinion dealing with the exemption
of labor unions from the antitrust laws, the majority opinion of Justice
White declared that "Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted
effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose. '"' Con-
sequently, the Court concluded that:
Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the
antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition.
Such conduct is not illegal, standing alone or as part of a broader
scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act. 9
As one commentator aptly points out, 0 Justice White referred to
Noerr as involving an alleged conspiracy "on evidence consisting entirely
of activities of competitors seeking to influence public officials."', In
Pennington Justice White found reversible error in an instruction to the
16381 U.S. 657 (1965).
1741 U.S.C. § 35(b) (1970).
1381 U.S. at 670 (1965).
11381 U.S. at 657.
2Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MICH. L.
REv. 333, 336 (1967). See also Concerted Action to Influence Governmental Bodies, BNA
ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION TODAY 27 (1967).
21381 U.S. at 669 (Emphasis added).
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jury which did not exculpate other means of conspiring beyond the influ-
encing of public officials.
Noerr's Compatibility With American Political Traditions Evaluated
The core concepts of the Noerr doctrine should have occasioned little
surprise among antitrust specialists except possibly for the exoneration
of deliberate deception of the public and public officials in the "third-
party technique" publicity campaign used by both the railroads and
truckers. For the Sherman Act reflects a mixture of political and social
values as well as purely economic motivations.
The standards of the major Sherman Act prompted Chief Justice
Hughes to characterize the statute in these terms:
As a charter of freedom, the act has a generality and adaptabil-
ity comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional pro-
visions.22
But judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act are focused on the
statute as a charter of economic freedom. The Attorney General's Anti-
trust Committee Report begins with the following declaration:
The general objective of the antitrust laws is promotion of
competition in open markets. This policy is a primary feature of
private enterprise. Most Americans have long recognized that
opportunity for market access and fostering of market rivalry are
the basic tenets of our faith in competition as a form of economic
organization.
2 3
The Committee, however, did not fail also to note that:
Antitrust is a distinctive American means for assuring the
competitive economy on which our political and social freedom
under representative government in part depend.
2
1
The Noerr rationale took cognizance of the need for accommodating
the antitrust goals of maintaining and promoting a dynamic private enter-
prise competitive process and the reality that antitrust policy must func-
tion in a democratic system where the profound values of political free-
doms and social goals interact with business activities for profit. The
Noerr Court thus formulated guidelines for reconciliation of the above
objectives on a premise not precisely articulated in the Sherman Act but
nevertheless presumed to be in harmony with its Congressional intent.
2Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
23
REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 1 (1955).
21Id. at 2.
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
The Noerr doctrine, applicable to federal, state and local levels of
government, properly recognized that group lobbying pressure is as
American as hot dogs and hamburgers. Many lower federal courts subse-
quent to Noerr and Pennington and before the Supreme Court decision
in Trucking gave full effect to the breadth of exoneration from antitrust
liability which the unqualified Supreme Court's language in both opinions
commanded.2
The Trucking Unlimited"8 Rationale-Abuse of Adjudicatory Processes
and the "Sham" Exception to Noerr
The district court had summarily dismissed the complaint upon the
ground that the alleged conduct was within the immunity of Noerr-
PenningtonY The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.2 One of its
grounds was that Noerr-Pennington applied only to concerted efforts to
influence legislative enactment and executive enforcement of laws. The
alternative ground was that the alleged activities fell within the "sham"
exception of Noerr-Pennington.
Allegations of Trucking Unlimited Complaint
The complaint was filed in a civil antitrust suit under Section 4 of the
25E.g.. George Benz & Sons v. Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 679 (D.
Minn. 1969); Schenley Indus., Inc. v. New Jersey Wine & Spirits Wholesalers Ass'n, 272
F. Supp. 872 (D.N.J. 1967); United Stats v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440 (E.D.
Pa. 1966); A.B.T. Sightseeing Tours, Inc. v. Gray Line N.Y. Tours Corp., 242 F. Supp.
365 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Noerr-Pennington was held inapplicable in George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock
Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Woods
Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, - U.S. - (1972); Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters
Local 150, 440 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1971) (group intimidation of government official by
threats and coercive conduct).
In Woods Exploration it was alleged that the defendants filed false forecasts with the
state Railroad Commission of the amount of natural gas the defendants expected to market.
A judgment for defendants was reversed on two grounds: (a) the filing of the false forecasts
was not designed to influence governmental policy within Noerr's immunity; and (b) the
Commission's regulations, which may have taken the false estimates into account, did not
constitute state action within Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See text infra for
discussion of the interrelation of the two doctrines.
2California -Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 92 S. Ct. 609 (1972). The
majority opinion was written by Justice Douglas. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Bren-
nan, wrote a concurring opinion. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in the
decision.
27Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 1967 CCH Trade Cas. 72,298
(N.D. Calif. 1967). See Note, Antitrust: The Brakes Fail on the Noerr Doctrine, 57 CALIF.
L. REV. 518 (1969).
2Irucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970).
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Clayton Act for injunctive relief and treble damages brought by fourteen
(14) plaintiffs engaged as highway trucking companies operating under
certificates issued by the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC)
for intrastate traffic and under authorizations of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) for interstate traffic. The complaint charged
nineteen (19) defendant trucking companies, likewise operating as com-
petitors under authority of the PUC and ICC, with a conspiracy to
monopolize commerce in transportation of goods in violation of Sections
I and 2 of the Sherman Act.
It was alleged that the purpose of the conspiracy was to put the
plaintiffs and their competitors out of business; to that end, the defen-
dants agreed jointly to finance, carry out and publicize a systematic and
uninterrupted program of opposing, with or without probable cause and
regardless of the merits, virtually every application for additional operat-
ing rights or for registration and transfer of operating rights, before the
California PUC, the ICC and the courts.
It was further alleged that the defendants carried out their agreement
in the following respects: (a) appearing as protestants in all proceedings
begun by plaintiffs and others or by instituting oppositions to applica-
tions, transfers or registrations; (b) establishing a trust fund to finance
the above activities, by monthly contributions in amounts proportionate
to each defendant's annual gross income; and (c) publicizing and making
known to plaintiffs and others in like position the above program.
Other allegations stated that without the agreement among defen-
dants, protests and oppositions would not have been made as part of a
program; that the defendants also jointly resisted rehearings, reviews or
appeals sought by plaintiffs or other competitors; that defendants have
depleted the resources of plaintiffs and other competitors in resisting the
defendants' conspiratorial conduct; that defendants have defeated appli-
cations of plaintiffs and other competitors on the basis of decisions which,
but for the defendants' conspiracy, would not have been adversely ren-
dered if the agencies and courts had not been deprived of the benefit of
facts and information because of the conspiracy.
The foregoing allegations of the complaint cover the essential allega-
tions quoted verbatim in the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart. The
majority opinion of Justice Douglas, after quoting one allegation con-
cerning the purpose of the complaint, added the following paragraph
largely in Justice Douglas' own characterization of the allegations regard-
ing the "sham" exception of Noerr:
More critical are other allegations, which are too lengthy to
quote, and which elaborate on the 'sham' theory by stating that
the power, strategy, and resources of the petitioners were used to
harass and deter respondents in their use of administrative and
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
judicial proceedings so as to deny them 'free and unlimited' access
to those tribunals. The result, it is alleged, was that the machinery
of the agencies and courts was effectively closed to respondents
and petitioners indeed became 'the regulators of the grants of
rights, transfers, and registrations' to respondents-thereby dim-
inishing the value of the business of respondents and aggrandizing
petitioners' economic and monopoly power.
29
Majority and Concurring Opinions in Trucking Unlimited Analyzed
In the light of the above summation of the allegations of the com-
plaint, the reasoning and conclusions of the majority opinion of the Court
and the criticisms in the concurring opinions of Justices Stewart and
Brennan may be better understood.
First, we note that the majority opinion, remanding the case for trial,
concluded with the statement that taking the allegations of the complaint
"at face value" for purposes of a motion to dismiss the complaint, the
allegations "come within the 'sham' exception in the Noerr case, as
adapted to the adjudicatory process.""0
The core of the disagreement between the majority and concurring
Justices appears to pivot on the judicial criteria for resolving the fact issue
of conduct within the "sham" exception in Noerr. Was the concerted
conduct of the defendants motivated by an intent to block access of the
plaintiffs and other competitors to the PUC and ICC and the courts or
was the conduct a good faith exercise of the right of petition protected
by the First Amendment? While this is a question of fact for trial on the
merits, the Court sought to provide the legal standards for application
to the particularized facts of each case.
There is no doubt that Trucking Unlimited extends the Noerr-
Pennington antitrust immunity to joint activities to persuade administra-
tive agencies and courts exercising their adjudicatory functions.2 ' But the
192 S. Ct. at 612. See Note, Antitrust: The Brakes Fail on the Noerr Doctrine, 57
CALIF. L. REV. 518 (1969).
192 S. Ct. at 614.
"There may be a threshold question of whether the government body or enforcement
official is being induced to act in an adjudicative capacity as against a legislative or adminis-
trative capacity. Sometimes the terms "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" are used. See
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
Professor Kenneth Davis defines an administrative agency as "a governmental author-
ity, other than a court and other than a legislative body, which affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rule making." I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 1:01 (1958) (hereinafter cited as DAVIS). Davis differentiates rule making from
adjudication as follows: "A rule (or a 'regulation'-a term used interchangeably with 'rule')
is the product of rule making, and rule making is the part of the administrative process
which resembles a legislature's enactment of a statute. Adjudication is the part of the
administrative process that resembles a court's decision of a case." Id. at § 5:01.
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scope of that immunity and the legal criteria for determining its metes
and bounds generated conflicting approaches between the majority and
concurring Justices.
A first reading of both opinions may create the impression that Jus-
tices Stewart and Brennan, who agreed on remanding the case for trial,
took out of context a few sentences in Justice Douglas' majority opinion
as a basis for a mere semantic dispute. Close analysis of both opinions,
however, should dispel this superficial impression.
The concurring opinion reflects more than meets the eye when it flatly
asserts that "[tioday the Court retreats from Noerr and in the process
tramples upon First Amendment values." 2
That resounding attack is made despite two conclusions stated in the
majority opinion. After observing that "Certainly the right to petition
extends to all departments of the government," the Court said:
We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of associa-
tion and of petition to hold that groups with common interests
may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and
procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate
their causes and points of view respecting resolution of their busi-
ness and economic interests vis-a-vis their competitors.3
After a review of several first amendment cases, the majority declared it
was clear
The above distinctions may present troublesome initial questions of determining the
capacity in which the governmental agency or official is acting. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals declared that "Licensing proceedings are adjudicative rather than legislative in
nature." 432 F.2d at 758 n.4. The court cited Davis at § 7:02, characterizing as adjudicative
"facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and properties." Also cited is Judge
Friendly's article on The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition
of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 863, describing as judicial "the application of standards
of greater or less generality to concrete cases." Id. at 874.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Trucking Unlimited took pains to apply the
above distinctions in its discussion of Pennington. It said that
There is nothing to indicate that the administrative action sought to
be influenced [in Pennington] was adjudicatory; the language of the
Pennington opinion suggests that it was not. Clearly, the decision of TVA
officials to purchase their coal requirements on the open market was not
adjudicatory in character. The nature of the 'approach' to the Secretary
of Labor is unclear. The Secretary has a good deal of discretion in deter-
mining whether to initiate proceedings under the Walsh-Healey Act to set
a minimum wage in a given industry. . . .Moreover, even if we assume
that defendants sought to influence the wage determination itself, the
proceeding by which that determination is made, though including a hear-
ing . . . is nonetheless rule-making and quasi-legislative in nature. . ..
432 F.2d 755, 759 n.5.
3292 S. Ct. at 614.
112 S. Ct. at 612.
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(1) that any carrier has the right of access to agencies and
courts, within the limits, of course, of their prescribed procedures,
in order to defeat applications of its competitors for certificates
as highway carriers . . .
These affirmative declarations that the Noerr-Pennington philosophy
also shelters the approach of groups of citizens to administrative agencies
and courts as an integral part of the right of petition did not satisfy the
concurring Justices. The concurring opinion, after noting certain abuses
of the adjudicatory process, which it said were not alleged in the Trucking
Unlimited complaint, contrary to the implications in the majority opin-
ion, stated:
And in the absence of such conduct, I can see no difference, so far
as the antitrust laws and the First Amendment are concerned,
between trying to influence executive and legislative bodies and
trying to influence administrative and judicial bodies.
3
1
So far as the underlying issue of abuse of the adjudicatory process is
concerned, both opinions agree that conduct such as perjury, fraud 3 or
bribery 37 corrupt those processes. Justice Douglas added another exam-
ple of a conspiracy with a licensing authority to eliminate a competitor
as a possible antitrust violation.38 Justice Stewart added misrepresen-
tation of fact or law as an abuse before an adjudicatory tribunal.
The two opinions are also in agreement that intent or purpose is the
crucial element in resolving the question of fact whether the conduct is
within the "sham" exception. Justice Douglas noted allegations of the
complaint that the conspirators
sought to bar their competitors from meaningful access-to adjudi-
catory tribunals and so to usurp that decision-making process...
It is alleged that petitioners [defendants] "instituted the proceed-
"Id. at 614.
51d. at 615 (Brennan & Stewart, Ji., concurring).
"Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
That case held that obtaining a patent grant from the United States Patent Office by
knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts may violate section 2 of the Sherman Act,
provided all elements of violation of that provision are proved. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals cited Walker and other patent-antitrust cases, which were relied upon by Trucking
Unlimited in its Supreme Court Brief at 50 et seq.
2Citing Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965) (bribery
of a public purchasing agent held a violation of the brokerage Section 2(c) of the Robinson-
Patman Act).
8Citing Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
In that case Justice White distinguished Noerr on the ground that the defendants "were
engaged in private commercial activity, no element of which involved seeking to procure
the passage or enforcement of laws." 370 U.S. at 707.
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ings and actions without probable cause, and regardless of the
merits of the cases" . . . 9
While those allegations were said not to determine invocation of First
Amendment rights; the majority opinion continued,
but they may bear upon a purpose to deprive the competitors of
meaningful access to the agencies and courts. As stated in the
concurring opinion, such a purpose or intent, if shown, would be
"to discourage and ultimately prevent the respondents from invok-
ing" the processes of the administrative agencies and courts and
thus fall within the exception to Noerr.40
The divergence between the majority and concurring opinions with
respect to the scope of the First Amendment right of petition and the
corresponding scope of antitrust immunity is compounded by certain
passages in the majority opinion which have colorations of subjective
reactions to the allegations of the complaint rather than a formulation
of a solely objective statement of the legal test relevant to the "sham"
exception. In the absence of record evidence on a motion to dismiss the
complaint, the Court's intimation of views on the merits may influence
the attitude of the district court during the trial or, in a jury case, may
likewise affect the judge's instructions to the jury. One such passage is
the following:
One claim, which a court or agency may think baseless, may go
unnoticed; but a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge
which leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and
judicial processes have been abused. That may be a difficult line
to discern and draw. But once it is drawn, the case is established
that abuse of those processes produced an illegal result viz. effec-
tively barring respondents from access to the agencies and courts.
Insofar as the administrative or judicial processes are involved,
actions of that kind cannot acquire immunity by seeking refuge
under the umbrella of "political expression."41
Another disputed comment is specifically referred to in the concurring
opinion as follows:
The Court concedes that the -defendants' "right of access to the
agencies and courts to be heard on applications sought by compet-
itive highway carriers . . . is part of the right of petition protected
by the First Amendment." Yet, says the Court, their joint agree-




ment to exercise that right "does not necessarily give them immun-
ity from the antitrust laws"...
It is difficult to imagine a statement more totally at odds with
Noerr. For what that case explicitly held is that the joint exercise
of the constitutional right of petition is given immunity from the
antitrust laws."
Justice Stewart did not refer to two other portions of the majority
opinion which may also be subject to the criticism of being tainted with
subjective commentary.
In one of his conclusions Justice Douglas, referring to the right of any
carrier to defeat applications of its competitors, said that
its purpose to eliminate an applicant as a competitor by denying
him free and meaningful access to the agencies and courts may be
implicit in that opposition.
4 3
In still another paragraph Justice Douglas, noting that "First Amend-
ment rights may not be used as the means or the pretext for achieving
'substantive evils' . . . which the legislature has the power to control,"
and further noting that "[c]ertainly the constitutionality of the antitrust
laws is not open to debate," continued:
A combination of entrepreneurs to harass and deter their com-
petitors from having 'free and unlimited access' to the agencies
and courts, to defeat that right by massive, concerted and purpose-
ful activities of the groups are ways of building up one empire and
destroying another. As stated in the concurring opinion, that is the
essence of those parts of the complaint to which we refer. If those
facts are proved, a violation of the antitrust laws has been estab-
lished. If the end result is unlawful, it matters not that the means
used in violation may be lawful.44
The foregoing quotations from the majority and concurring opinions
reveal the burden placed upon the trier of fact in determining whether the
"sham" exception in Noerr applies.
Justices Stewart and Brennan, on the one hand, stress giving the
broadest possible scope under the Noerr antitrust immunity to the right
of petition, safeguarded by the First Amendment, to efforts to influence
administrative agencies and the courts, short of proof of specific abuses
before those bodies mentioned supra. This approach otherwise makes no
distinction between influencing the adjudicatory processes and influenc-
ing the legislative and executive branches of government. On the other
21d. at 615 (Brennan & Stewart, JJ., concurring) (citations omitted).
1id. at 614 (emphasis added).
"id.
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hand, the concurring Justices declared that the plaintiffs are entitled to a
liberal construction of the complaint allegations in seeking to prove that
the "real intent" of the conspirators was within the "sham" exception
stated in Noerr as "an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor."4
The majority opinion of Justice Douglas, however, underscores the
balancing of the First Amendment right of petition, which is not abso-
lute,4" against the prohibitions of the antitrust laws when there is abuse
of the adjudicatory processes and resulting blocking of competitors from
access to the administrative agencies and the courts.
To that extent the majority opinion portends a contraction of the
scope of the Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity applied to adjudica-
tion before administrative agencies and courts as distinguished from peti-
tioning the legislative and executive enforcement branches of govern-
ment. 7 This divergence from the approach in the concurring opinion
obviously creates uncertainty in antitrust counseling and in appraising the
related thrust of the First Amendment right of petition. But there is
nothing startling in the antitrust field in this process of drawing the line
between permissible and illicit concerted conduct of competitors. This
often involves questions of degree and.of the relation of the facts found
in a trial on the merits. As Noerr emphasized, joint actions of competitors
4
SId. at 615 (Brennan & Stewart, JJ., concurring), quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
46The majority opinion of Justice Douglas stated that
It is well settled that First Amendment rights are not immunized
from regulation when they are used as an integral part of conduct which
violates a valid statute.
92 S. Ct. at 613.
Also cited on that point are two Sherman Act cases: Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945) and Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969). 92 S.
Ct. at 613-14.
Justice Douglas further stated that "First Amendment rights may not be used as the
means or the pretext for achieving 'substantive evils,' (see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415),
. .92 S Ct. at 614.
7This was perceptively anticipated by the majority opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Trucking Unlimited, where the court said:
The overwhelming public interest in uninhibited communication be-
tween the people and their legislators and law enforcement officials that
justifies immunizing joint efforts to influence those authoritites from anti-
trust liability despite either wrongful purpose or the use of distortion and
deception, does not apply to presentations to judges and administrative
officials in the course of adjudicative proceedings. Unlike legislators and
law enforcement officials, judicial and administrative adjudicators do not
act in a representative capacity. There is a marked difference between the
processes by which they arrive at decisions, the materials upon which they
may properly rely, and the atmosphere consistent with effective perform-
ance of their respective functions.
432 F.2d at 759 n.6 (citation omitted).
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in lobbying to influence legislation or executive enforcement of laws are
"essentially dissimilar" from the traditional illegal per se Sherman Act
violations. Trucking Unlimited also recognizes that essential dissimilarity
when competitors jointly seek to persuade the administrative tribunal or
the court in adjudicatory proceedings. This appears to make normally
appropriate an extended Rule of Reason inquiry into all of the relevant
facts and surrounding circumstances. If that is so, resolution of the cru-
cial question of the intent or purpose of the concerted efforts will enable
the trier of fact to use its finding on intent to interpret the other facts
found in full context of the record evidence and to evaluate the probable
effects of the totality of findings of fact.
As we stated supra, in retrospect the blanket antitrust immunity ap-
proach of Noerr-Pennington to concerted efforts of a group of competi-
tors, or a trade or professional association,"8 to influence legislation or
law enforcement comports with American traditions of freedom of politi-
cal action. Trucking Unlimited properly does not constrict that freedom
in the areas of the legislature and the executive branch of government.
But even before the Supreme Court ruling in Trucking Unlimited, several
lower federal courts did not literally apply the "no-holds-barred" contest
Noerr seemingly sanctioned.49
The majority opinion in Trucking Unlimited correctly distinguished
the sweeping Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity in the political arena
from its less extensive scope before adjudicatory tribunals. Abuses of
adjudicatory processes should not be condoned under the rubric of free-
dom of political expression. For beyond the abuses specified in the major-
ity and concurring opinions in Trucking Unlimited, there is a basic differ-
ence between the give and take and compromises of the legislative pro-
cess, or the allowable range of importuning executive enforcement offi-
cials, and the procedures prescribed for orderly and impartial resolution
48Trade and professional associations frequently resort to concerted and organized
efforrs to influence legislation or enforcement of laws. Those activities have broad antitrust
immunity under Noerr-Pennington when they are political in nature. Trucking Unlimited
may now make antitrust counseling more significant if an association resorts to an adminis-
trative agency or the courts and its conduct raises questions regarding abuse of adjudicatory
processes.
On industry and government relations generally and the Federal Regulation of Lobby-
ing Act, see G. LAMB & C. SHIELDS, TRADE ASSOCIATION LAW & PRACTICE (Trade Regula-
tion Series), ch. 11 (rev. ed. 1971).
See Oppenheim, Antitrust Policy and Third-Party Prepaid Prescription Drug Plan, 40
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 244 (1971) for relevance of Noerr-Pennington and Parker v. Brown,
note 50 infra, to activities of pharmaceutical associations.
"'See George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970), discussed infra; Woods Exploration & Produc-
ing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
U.S. .--- cf. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
U.S. - (1972), discussed note 54 infra.
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of adversary adjudicatory proceedings before an administrative agency or
a court. The Trucking Unlimited majority opinion places no ban on joint
efforts merely seeking to persuade the tribunal to rule in favor of the
competitive interests espoused by the group. But the majority of the
Court was on sound ground in rejecting the view that pressure group
tactics, imbedded in the historic American sanction of lobbying activities
aimed at informing the legislators or government enforcement officials,
should have the same unlimited scope before adjudicatory bodies.
We have focused upon the relation of Noerr-Pennington to adjudica-
tory processes which may raise antitrust questions in both the regulated
industries sector and in private enterprises not under such regulatory
controls. We therefore do not purport to review lower federal court rul-
ings solely on Noerr-Penington applied to the legislative and executive
branches of government. Those decisions were also not considered rele-
vant in Trucking Unlimited and hence none of them were cited in either
the majority or concurring opinions.
Intersection of Noerr-Pennington and Parker v. Brown
Antitrust counselors, however, may derive some guidance from the
limitations several lower federal courts placed upon Noerr-Pennington
and the corollary doctrine of Parker v. Brown,"0 where the Supreme
Court held that the federal antitrust laws do not apply to valid state
-317 U.S. 341 (1943). Brown, a raisin producer, sued to enjoin Parker, State Director
of Agriculture, and others from enforcing the California Agricultural Prorate Act, a pro-
gram for marketing raisins in California. One of Brown's contentions was that the program
violated the Sherman Act. The defendants were authorized by the statute to promulgate a
marketing proration plan to achieve the objective of the statute by remedying overproduc-
tion of raisins, thus preventing agricultural waste without allowing unreasonable profits to
producers. The program could become effective only with the approval of an Advisory
Commission and if approved, had to be submitted to a referendum of producers and passed
before having the force of law subject to criminal penalties for violations. The Director of
Agriculture was authorized, subject to Commission approval, to select a program commit-
tee composed of producers and other private persons.
In dealing with the validity of the prorate program and the alleged violation of the
Sherman Act, the Court, per Chief Justice Stone, held that the program involved state
action and not action of private parties, even though the latter participated in the decision-
making process. The Court therefore concluded that the restraint of trade was imposed by
the state acting as a sovereign and was not the kind of restraint the Sherman Act undertook
to prohibit.
Chief Justice Stone said that the program "derived its authority and its efficacy from
the legislative command of the state and was not intended to operate or become effective
without that command." 317 U.S. at 350.
He added that "[W]e find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history
which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities
directed by its legislature." 317 U.S. at 350-351.
This article does not purport to review cases where Parker issues alone are presented,
as, for example, in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. Power Co., 438 F.2d 248
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regulatory programs enacted by the state as a sovereign. In Noerr the
Court cited United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc.,51 and Parker
v. Brown as holding that
where a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of
valid governmental action, as opposed to private action, no viola-
tion of the [Sherman] Act can be made out.
52
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion cited both of the above decisions
as a corollary of the conclusions reached in Noerr. But this has not
deterred several lower federal courts from reading exceptions into Noerr-
Pennington and its intersection with Parker v. Brown.53 The types of
conduct held to be outside the shelter of the above Supreme Court cases
as applied to legislative enactments and law enforcement were properly
condemned and should have signaled a basis for predicting that the Su-
preme Court would not countenance a wholly unrestricted antitrust im-
munity applied to adjudicatory proceedings.
This is exemplified in several private suits involving competitors
where the court declined to construe either the Parker v. Brown or Noerr-
Pennington antitrust immunity, considered separately or together, as con-
ferring total antitrust immunity upon all actions of a state agency or
public officials induced by private firms. As Judge Wilkey perceptively
observed in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc.,51 the mere fact that state action
(4th Cir. 1971) and Gas Light of Columbus v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir.
1971). But see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969). See
also Asheville Bd. of Trade v. Federal Trade Commission, 263 F.2d 5020 (4th Cir. 1959);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
In Asheville, supra the court recognized the Parker exemption but added: "On the other
hand, 'a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing
them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful,'" citing Schwegmann Bros.
v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
See Comment, GovernmentalAction and Antitrust Immunity, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 521
(1971); Bachelder, State-Approved Transactions, 33 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 99 (1967).
51307 U.S. 533 (1939). This involved a federal regulatory program under the Agricul-
tural Marketing Act administered by the Secretary of Agriculture.
52365 U.S. at 136.
See note 25 supra.
54444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 701 (1972). The District of
Columbia Armory Board, pursuant to authority, leased the Kennedy Stadium for thirty
years to the Washington Redskins, with the exclusive right to use that facility for football
games. Plaintiffs, potential competitiors, brought suit charging that the lease violated the
Sherman Act. The court, per Judge Wilkey, held that the validity of restrictive provision
in the lease must be tested by the federal antitrust laws as usually applied to contracts
between private parties.
The court began its analysis with the Parker doctrine since the parties had presented
their argument on that basis. It is noteworthy that Judge Wilkey, apparently having in mind
the federal power of Congress to enact laws for the District of Columbia, construed Parker
as limited to a finding that the action of the state is consistent with federal regulatory policy.
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and a state agency are involved "is only the beginning of the inquiry" and
does not automatically exclude application of antitrust policy prohibi-
tions.
The cases to which we refer raise antitrust implications as applicable
to the adjudicatory processes involved in Trucking Unlimited as to in-
ducement of legislation and enforcement of laws. They distinguish be-
tween action by the state in its sovereign capacity and situations where
restraint of trade, monopolization, or attempt to monopolize result from
commercial or business operations of a state agency. When the state
enters the marketplace as a purchaser of goods and services under pro-
curement programs, its business operations are normally governed by
economic considerations dissimilar from criteria when the state acts in
its sovereign capacity.5 In Parker v. Brown the Supreme Court indicated
an area where the state may not be immune from antitrust sanctions when
it said:
[W]e have no question of the state or its municipalities becoming
a participant in a private agreement or combination by others for
restraint of trade.
56
If such conduct is banned by Parker v. Brown or Noerr-Pennington
or both doctrines in connection with efforts to induce legislation or en-
forcement of existing laws, we believe that a fortiori the same conduct
would be banned under the rationale of the majority opinion in Trucking
Unlimited. With that in view, we turn to cases presenting that issue.
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.5 7 is one
illustrative situation. Whitten and the three affiliated corporations of
Paddock are competitors specializing in the manufacture of pipeless
swimming pools for sale primarily to public agencies. Paddock is by far
the largest supplier of pipeless pools. Whitten brought a civil antitrust suit
charging that Paddock's selling efforts violated Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act by conspiring to require the use of the Paddock specifica-
tions in the public swimming pool industry with the intent to exclude the
competition of Whitten. The district court granted summary judgment
dismissing Whitten's complaint. In vacating the summary judgment and
remanding the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion, the court
In Hecht the District of Columbia was apparently treated as equivalent to state regulation,
but the governing statute with respect to the Board was federal. But see E.W. Wiggins
Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
947 (1966). There the Port Authority operated an airport under a legislative mandate and
leased the airport as an exclusive base of operation to a private corporation. The court held
that was a valid governmental function not subject to the federal antitrust laws.
-E.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970), discussed infra.
16317 U.S. at 351-52.
11424 F.2d 25 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
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of appeals stressed that it was addressing itself only to the question of
immunity from the antitrust laws and not with the broader issue of
whether Paddock's conduct in fact violated the Sherman Act. It judged
the issues by what it set forth as an "artificially stark set of facts."5
The court of appeals stated that public agencies operated under var-
ious state and local competitive bidding procedures. It is the common
practice for a public body to retain an architect who drafts the technical
specifications on which the bids will be based. To a high degree Paddock
has been successful in persuading architects to adopt Paddock's own and
exclusive specifications. The court assumed it to be established that Pad-
dock falsely advertised itself as the only manufacturer of pipeless swim-
ming pool equipment; made false statements about Whitten's lack of
experience; and threatened litigation against public bodies contracting
with, or contemplating contracting with, Whitten.
Considering the case as one where the government acts in a proprie-
tary capacity of purchasing goods and services to satisfy its own needs,
the court of appeals rejected Paddock's reliance upon Parker v. Brown
and Noerr-Pennington as defenses.
With respect to Parker v. Brown, the court said:
Our reading of Parker convinces us that valid government action
confers antitrust immunity only when government determines that
competition is not the summum bonum in a particular field and
deliberately attempts to provide an alternative form of public reg-
ulation.
In terms of such deliberate government occupation of a field
normally left to the free winds of competition, this case falls at the
opposite end of the spectrum from Parker.59
1Id. at 27.
51d. at 30. In Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agcy., 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir.
1970), Bi-State, a joint agency of the states of Missouri and Illinois created by the legisla-
tures of those states, had acquired with the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion fifteen companies engaged in motor bus operations in the St. Louis metropolitan area,
where the public transportation system was operated as a monopoly. Plaintiff, engaged in
private bus transportation in the metropolitan St. Louis area charged the Bi-State agency
with violation of the Sherman Act.
The court, relying on Parker, held that Bi-State, having acted pursuant to legislative
authorization, was not subject to the antitrust laws. The court said:
When a state determines that it is in the public interest to operate a
public transportation system as a monopoly, or when two states enter into
a congressionally approved compact to do so, the antitrust laws do not
apply, whether the operation is labeled proprietary or governmental. The
fact that the effect of the compact gives Bi-State a monopoly, and that
competitive interests of private concerns are harmed does not violate the
Sherman Act. We deem it well settled that when a state announces a
public policy against free competition in an industry essential to it, state
control and regulation of that industry, even to the extent of eliminating
competition, is permissible.
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Distinguished from the cases where the state policy is neutral or silent
regarding restraints of trade, the instant case, said the court, is one where
"state policy is neither anti-competitive nor neutral."" The court con-
cluded that:
When the government acts under laws requiring competitive
bidding, it signifies its intent to respond to the signals of a competi-
tive market on the same terms as any other consumer, an intent
which is entirely consistent with the aims of the Sherman Act. This
intent would be frustrated, and the ultimate cost to the public
substantially increased, if some sellers could nevertheless engage
in anti-competitive practices merely because they were dealing
with government. 6
With respect to Paddock's claim of a Noerr-Pennington defense, the
court addressed itself to "the question of whether a particular attempt to
influence a public official is the kind of political activity which Noerr
protects. ' 6 2 Answering that question in the negative, the court said:
Noerr stressed the importance of free access to public officials
vested with significant policy-making discretion. We doubt
whether the Court, without expressing additional rationale, would
have extended the Noerr umbrella to public officials engaged in




The court differentiated a case where a petitioner sought legislation
to change public bidding requirements. In the case at bar
The state legislators, by enacting statutes requiring public bid-
ding, have decreed that government purchases will be made ac-
cording to strictly economic criteria. . . . Paddock's dealings
with officials who administer the bid statutes should be subject to
the same limitations as its dealings with private consumers. ...
We conclude, therefore, that the immunity for efforts to influence
public officials in the enforcement of laws does not extend to
efforts to sell products to public officials acting under competitive
bidding statutes.
This conclusion does not, in our view, encroach on the freedom
of speech and right to petition protected by the First Amend-
ment.61
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In Whitten the court, after pointing out that the two doctrines are
often treated as one, said:
The two are not coterminous. For example, an unsuccessful
attempt to influence government action may fall within the Noerr-
Pennington immunity, but not the Parker immunity. Conversely,
a state regulatory agency may decide to restrain competition with-
out prompting; the benefactors, not having solicited government
action, would enjoy a Parker immunity but not one based on
Noerr-Pennington. Moreover, because of its First Amendment
overtones, the Noerr-Pennington immunity is arguably broader
than the Parker exemption. 5
Reading Whitten as a case where it could. be found as a fact that
Paddock's conduct had the purpose or intent of depriving Whitten and
other competitors of meaningful access to competitive bidding procedures
under state and local statutes, Whitten can be classified as a scheme to
corrupt public officials administering those statutes. Such conduct should
be ruled beyond antitrust immunity regardless of whether it falls within
the legislative, executive or Trucking Unlimited adjudicatory category of
governmental functions.
Two Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cases show difficult distinctions
which may confront a court in deciding where to draw the line between
Parker or Noerr-Pennington immunity and col'duct beyond the pale of
the federal antitrust immunity.
In Harman v. Valley National Bank of Arizona,6 the complaint al-"
leged that appellees induced the state Attorney General to file an action
resulting in placing a financial institution in receivership. So far as in-
forming the Attorney General of irregularities in the conduct of a com-
petitor was concerned, the court viewed that as within the Noerr exemp-
tion. But the court mentioned two factors it said might not necessarily
bar relief in the appellant's treble damage action charging violation of the
Sherman Act. One was the allegation that the acts of the Attorney Gen-
eral were acts of a coconspirator. The other factor was stated as follows:
The complaint can be read as alleging that appellees' joint
effort to influence the Attorney General was but one element in a
larger, long-continued scheme to restrain and monopolize "com-
mercial banking in general in the State of Arizona." 7
In Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co.,6" Judge
Browning, who wrote the opinion in Harman for a unanimous three judge
'LId.
"Id. at 29 n.4.
11339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
"ld. at 566.
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panel and sat on a panel of different judges in Sun Valley, confessed error
in failing to note that Pennington held that efforts to influence public
officials exercising their official powers do not violate the Sherman Act
"even though they are part of a broader scheme which does violate the
Act."69 In his concurring opinion in Sun Valley, Judge Browning there-
fore said, "to the extent that [Harman supra] . . . holds to the contrary
it is no longer good authority."70
In Sun Valley, a garbage disposal firm brought a treble damage suit
alleging violation of the Sherman Act. The complaint alleged that its
competitor induced county commissioners to grant an exclusive disposal
franchise in the county to one of Sun Valley's competitors. Sun Valley,
relying on Harman, supra, contended that the competitor made misrepre-
sentations in its bidding and that some commissioners participated in the
alleged conspiracy.
The court held that the personal motives of the county commissioners
were irrelevant under Noerr and noted that Pennington lessened the au-
thority of Harman, supra.
There is nevertheless room for applying a distinction between "a
broader scheme" directed at activating legislation or enforcement of ex-
isting legislation within the Noerr-Pennington immunity and conduct
unrelated to the intended reach of a state statute within the Parker ex-
emption.
Confusion may arise from failing to apply the above distinction.
Noerr-Pennington and Parker are not always inseparable within the same
contours of policy issues. The two doctrines may be disparate under the
particular circumstances of the case.
Illustrative is Semke v. Enid Automobile Dealers Ass'n.7' There the
plaintiff, who did not have a license to distribute new automobiles, oper-
ated a car buying service of obtaining on order from his customers auto-
mobiles of different makes from car dealers. The defendants concertedly
persuaded the Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Commission to file a suit to
enjoin permanently the plaintiff from conducting his car buying service.
In addition to petitioning the Commission, the defendant engaged in
activity allegedly illegal, namely, inducing local media to refuse to accept
plaintiff's advertising, and defendants also refused to provide warranty
service or to sell parts to the plaintiff for servicing the cars he sold.
The district court charged the jury that the plaintiff could not recover
damages for injury to his unlicensed business which was illegal under the
state statute.72
69420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969).
"Id. at 344 (Browning, J., concurring in part).
71Id.
725 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 91 73,892, at 91,705 (10th Cir. 1972).
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The court of appeals, in a perceptive opinion by Judge Doyle, held
that the licensed car dealers acted lawfully within the Noerr-Pennington
immunity73 and the Parker exemption, but this did not extend to conspir-
acies unrelated to enforcement of the Oklahoma licensing statute.
74
Effects of Trucking Unlimited Rationale on Antitrust Counseling
The analysis in this article recognizes that the majority and concur-
ring opinions in Trucking Unlimited leave a murky area of predictability
for the antitrust counselor on the question of intent or purpose. On the
one hand, there are the parties who will rely upon a sweeping application
of the Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity. On the other hand, there are
the parties who will claim that misuse of governmental adjudicatory
processes brings the case within the Sherman Act liability of conspirators
whose conduct is intended to suppress competition by causing injury to
their competitors.
As previously indicated, there is no prospect that the courts can for-
mulate a single guide for discerning and drawing the line for neatly classi-
fying cases within the ambit of antitrust immunity and those which fall
within the "sham" exception of Noerr because of an illegal intent to
interfere directly with the business relationships of competitors.
The uncertainty and resulting counseling difficulty should come as no
surprise to antitrust specialists. The judicial process in antitrust cases still
involves a tug-of-war between the illegal per se doctrinal approach and
an extended Rule of Reason analysis.
75
Trucking Unlimited allows great latitude for attempts to activate
legislatures and law enforcement officials within Noerr-Pennington. But
the majority of the Supreme Court, while recognizing the profound values
of the First Amendment and right of petition, wisely perceived the need
for applying a check rein upon misuse of governmental judicatory pro-
cesses.
The antitrust counselor will be faced with a major hazard of trying
to evaluate how a court will resolve the crucial question of intent just as
the court itself may have difficulty in arriving at findings of fact on that
issue. There should be no undue difficulty, however, in identifying the
types of conduct, such as those specified in the majority and concurring
opinions in Trucking Unlimited, which are per se illegal as corruption of
the administrative and court adjudicatory procedures.
76
13320 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Okla. 1970).
"There was no evidence of fraud, corruption or misuse of state process to bring the
case within the "sham" exception of Noerr.
7 The Court said this introduced a species of in pari delicto or contributory illegality
as a defense.
7 'The most recent example is United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 92 S. Ct. 1126
(1972), holding illegal per se under the Sherman Act a horizontal allocation of territories
1972]
232 WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
to small or medium sized regional supermarket chains, members of a cooperative buying
association with exclusive licenses to sell the association's private label brands. Justice
Blackmun concurred in the result. Chief Justice Burger wrote an extensive dissenting opin-
ion and declared:
I do not believe that our prior decisions justify the result reached by
the majority. Nor do I believe that a new perse rule should be established
in disposing of this case, for the judicial convenience and ready predictabil-
ity that are made possible by per se rules are not such overriding consider-
ations in antitrust law as to justify their promulgation without careful
prior consideration of the relevant economic realities in the light of the
basic policy and goals of the Sherman Act.
92 S. Ct. 1126 at 1137. Cf United Stats v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967);
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (vertical territorial limitations). In
his dissent, Chief Justice Burger disagreed with the majority's description of United States
v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) as being "on all fours with" Topco. 92 S. Ct. 1126, at
1138 n.3. See Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
625 (1966); Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 1165 (1964);
S. C. OPPENHEIM & G. E. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS-CASES AND COMMENTS
3-21 (3d ed. 1968); 561 B.N.A. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. B-I (May 2, 1972).
Antitrust practitioners are aware of the problem of proof of the element of "deliberate-
ness" as part of the offense of "monopolization" under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and
of the problem of proof of a subjective specific intent as part of an attempt to monopolize,
another Section 2 offense. See S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS-CASES AND COMMENTS, ch. 7, § 2 (single firm monopolization) & ch. 7, § 4 (at-
tempt to monopolize) (3d ed. 1968).
"6E.g., notes 18-20 supra. In Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., No. 24,622 (D.C. Cir.,
May 17, 1962), plaintiffs charged the defendants, two drug companies, with conspiring to
keep their drug from being approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration, thereby
favoring defendants' similar competitive drug. As characterized in the court's opinion, the
plaintiffs alleged that "the defendants conspired to keep the plaintiffs' drug off the interstate
market . . . by influencing the Food and Drug Administration to deny fair consideration
of the new drug applications filed by plaintiffs" and "carried out this conspiracy by sup-
pressing, concealing and misconstruing information concerning the two drugs before the
FDA".
In remanding the case to the district court with directions to retain jurisdiction of the
subject matter, the court of appeals, in an excellent opinion by Judge Wilkey, also the
author of the court's opinion in Hecht v. Pro Football. supra note 54, relied upon the
Supreme Court's rationale in Trucking Unlimited as the "coup de grace" to defendants'
defense based upon Noerr-Pennington.
After referring to the basic concern expressed by several courts with respect to "the
integrity of the regulatory process", Judge Wilkey said:
No actions which impair the fair and impartial functioning of an
administrative agency should be able to hide behind the cloak of an anti-
trust exemption.
After reviewing judicial decisions narrowing the applicability of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, Judge Wilkey concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations in the instant case fell
within the "sham" exception to Noerr-Pennington:
Plaintiffs in the case at bar allege that the real purpose of defendants'
joint efforts is to preclude, not induce, fair FDA consideration of the
safety and efficacy of plaintiffs' drug Cothyrobal for interstate sale, and
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
A good faith resort to Noerr-Pennington for an avowed and open
political purpose of making known to the legislature factual information
and views to induce new legislation or amendment of existing legislation
should also be readily ascertained by the antitrust counselor. In that area
misrepresentation and unethical conduct are condoned under Noerr but
such practices may backfire and should be avoided as a practical matter.
When efforts are directed at activating a government body or an
individual government official entrusted with law enforcement, the differ-
entiation of the licit from the illicit may become blurred. The counselor
must ascertain the nature and scope of the statutory authority as well as
the range of discretion vested in the government commission or official.
This is relevant to a determination of whether the petitioners are merely
seeking to activate authorized administrative or executive enforcement or
whether they. have engaged in misuse of adjudicatory processes of the
government agency or official. In this area intentional use of baseless
claims and deceptive practices should not be immune from Sherman Act
prohibitions against either individual or conspiratorial abuse of adjudica-
tory channels when there is evidence to support a finding of a design
dirrectly to injure business relationships with competitors.
Control over entry into the market or continuing to do business
therein is today subject to a plethora of federal, state and local regulatory
and licensing enactments administered by commissions and licensing au-
thorities.77 The majority opinion in Trucking Unlimited warned against
blocking access of competitors to those government agencies or to market
entry dependent upon licensing or renewal of licenses. This does not deny
an individual competitor or a group of competitors the right to show that
additional competitive firms would be contrary to the public interest
standards of the particular regulatory or licensing statute. Radically dif-
ferent, however, is a situation where there is no statutory authority or
discretion to reduce or preclude competitive rivalry as an alternative to
an open competitive market. There is also the initial question of whether
the action of the government agency or official is purely administrative
in nature or adjudicatory.
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The frequent reference to concerted conduct of competitors in the
Trucking Unlimited opinions of the Court leaves open an inference that
as such should be viewed as falling within the 'sham' exception to Noerr-
Pennington.
Judge Wilkey's opinion in Hecht v. Pro Football, supra and in Israel v. Baxter
Laboratories, should contribute substantially as guides to the judicial process of appraising
either allegations or evidence which foreshadow a narrowing of Noerr-Pennington's applica-
bility when there is misuse of the processes of administrative regulatory agencies and the
courts.
7See Truitt, Interstate Trade Barriers in the United States, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
209 (1941) (governmental marketing barriers).7'Note 31 supra.
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similar conduct of an individual competitor would or may be sheltered
by antitrust immunity. If such a distinction was intended by the Court,
it is of doubtful validity. A single firm which has a monopolistic or
dominant position in an industry or business should be as accountable for
abuse of the administrative or court adjudicatory processes as a combina-
tion of competitors who collectively possess like market power. On the
cruicial question of intent under the "sham" exception of Noerr, the
market power of the single petitioner or a combination of petitioners
should be regarded as only one factor in resolving the question of intent.
An illegal intent to abuse the adjudicatory process should not turn on
mere business size or on oligopoly market structure in the relevant mar-
ket affected by the petition for law enforcement.
Finally, the antitrust counselor must be prepared to consider on the
particularized facts of each case whether the issue is entirely confined to
the Parker doctrine that there is no violation of the Sherman Act when
the restraint of trade or monopolization results from valid state action
or whether Parker is interconnected with Noerr-Pennington so that both
doctrines must be considered.
The analysis of those aspects in this article shows that Parker alone,
or the intersection of Parker and Noerr-Pennington, add elements of
uncertainty in counseling beyond that involved in merely applying the
Trucking Unlimited rationale to determine whether the conduct is within
the Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity or within the "sham"
exception. In any event, it is clear that while "The heart of our national
economic, policy long has been faith in the value of competition,"79 Parker
nevertheless teaches that the Sherman Act does not preempt state action
in enacting a state statute which substitutes a policy of regulation for a
policy of competition like that subject to Sherman Act enforcement. 0
"Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951).
"Cf Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39
A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 950 (1970).
